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Abstract
Good governance requires the accommodation of  multiple interests in the cause of  decision-making.
However, undue regard for particular sectional interests can take its toll upon public faith in government
administration. Historically, broad conceptions of  the good of  the commonwealth were employed to outweigh
the interests of  groups that resisted colonisation. In the decision-making of  the British Empire, the standard
approach for justifying the marginalisation of  the interests of  colonised groups was that they were uncivilised
and that particular hardships were the price to be paid for bringing to them the imperial dividend of
industrial society. It is widely assumed that with the dismantling of  the British Empire, such impulses and
their accompanying jurisprudence became a thing of  the past. Even as decolonisation proceeded apace after
the Second World War, however, the UK maintained control of  strategically important islands with a view
towards sustaining its global role. In an infamous example from this twilight period of  empire, in the 1960s
imperial interests were used to justify the expulsion of  the Chagos islanders from the British Indian Ocean
Territory (BIOT). Into the twenty-first century, this forced elision of  the UK’s interests with the imperial
‘common good’ continues to take centre stage in courtroom battles over the islanders’ rights, being cited before
domestic and international tribunals in order to maintain the Chagossians’ exclusion from their homeland.
This article considers the new jurisprudence of  imperialism which has emerged in a string of  decisions which
have continued to marginalise the Chagossians’ interests. 
Keywords: Chagos Islands; enforced removal; imperialism; national security; human 
rights; WikiLeaks
Introduction: from old to new imperialism
From the 1970s onwards the debate over colonialism has been winding down. Once themajor elements of  the European empires had been broken up, the UN Committee of
24 on decolonisation,1 in the 1960s one of  the mainstays of  the UN’s institutional
apparatus, became a backwater of  international relations. Attention turned to
manifestations of  neo-imperialism, from disadvantageous trade deals foisted on newly
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1 Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of  the Declaration on the Granting
of  Independence of  Colonial Countries and Peoples, established in 1961 to implement UN General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960).
independent countries to bouts of  military adventurism under the auspices of  the Cold War
and, subsequently, neo-conservatism. 
The remnants of  the British Empire, and with them traditional imperial paradigms,
nonetheless continue to influence UK policy-making and jurisprudence. From the earliest
days of  empire the Privy Council heard appeals from cases arising in the colonies, with the
function of  ensuring that law as promulgated in the colonies was not ‘repugnant to the laws
of  England’.2 The courts of  England and Wales were also often prepared to stretch their
jurisdiction to ensure, in the words of  Lord Mansfield, that a colonial subject ‘has as good
a right to appeal to the King’s Courts of  Justice, as one who is born within the sound of
Bow Bell’.3 By such claims, the London courts held themselves out as a refuge for victims
of  colonial misrule when colonial courts often administered ‘only a very weak dilution of
English law’.4 But just as Richard Cobden fretted in the 1860s that UK politics ‘may become
corrupted’5 through the backwash of  practices expedient in the colonies, so too could these
cases enmesh the domestic courts in the imperial project. 
This article critically analyses the Chagos Islands cases as exemplifying the dilemmas
the domestic courts face in maintaining legal principles in the face of  the demands of  an
imperial project. When Michel Foucault considered constitutional law, he saw governance
arrangements as remainders of  past conflicts between factions within society, with the
challenge being to find ‘the blood which has dried in the legal codes’.6 The Chagos cases
are so significant precisely because they confront the courts not with dried blood but a
still-open wound and have required judges to consider imperial jurisprudence not as a
relic but as a living area of  law. As such, we read these cases as fitting into, rather than
striking out afresh from, this imperial record. In common with the Pitcairn Island
litigation7 and cases on act of  state doctrine,8 the Chagos cases have required judges to
‘confront’9 the fissure between long-established imperial doctrines and twenty-first-
century public law principles.10
The impact of  imperial jurisprudence has been marginalised by competing accounts of
the split House of  Lords decision in Bancoult (No 2),11 the centrepiece of  the Chagos
litigation. The Law Lords upheld a 2004 Order in Council issued by the UK government
which prevented the Chagossians from returning to their homeland. The majority reasoned
that because the Chagos Islands were part of  a conquered/ceded colony, they were subject
to the prerogative powers of  the Crown, which included a power to prevent resettlement.
Cautioning against confusing ‘history with adjudication’,12 Mark Elliot and Amanda
Perreau-Saussine foreground the constitutional principles at play in the case: ‘Bancoult is a
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2 For an example of  this oversight, see Ashbury v Ellis [1893] AC 339, 341 (Lord Hobhouse).
3 Mostyn v Fabrigas (1775) 1 Cowp 161, 171.
4 The Times, 8 December 1891, 9. See R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
[2005] UKHL 57; [2006] 1 AC 529, [65] (Lord Hoffmann).
5 J Morley, The Life of  Richard Cobden (Chapman & Hall 1879) vol II, 361. 
6 M Foucault, Il faut défendre la société: Cours au Collège de France (1975–1976) (Seuil/Gallimard 1997) 48.
7 See Christian v The Queen [2006] UKPC 47; [2007] 2 WLR 120, [33] (Lord Woolf).
8 See Al Jedda v Secretary of  State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758; [2011] 2 WLR 225.
9 A Perreau-Saussine, ‘British Acts of  State in English Courts’ (2007) 78 British Yearbook of  International Law
176, 243.
10 See S Farran, ‘Prerogative Rights, Human Rights and Island People: The Pitcairn and Chagos Island Cases’
[2007] Public Law 414, 418. 
11 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61; [2009] 1 AC 453.
12 M Elliott and A Perreau-Saussine, ‘Pyrrhic Public Law: Bancoult and the Sources, Status and Content of
Common Law Limitations on Prerogative Power’ [2009] Public Law 697, 701–02.
pyrrhic victory for those who regard executive power as constrained by the rule of  law’.13
T T Arvind, in turn, regards the majority judgments as being packaged in a formalist
manner but driven by inherently pragmatic concerns.14 He supports this claim by tracing
broad trends in contemporary appellate judgments which define and restrict the scope of
judicial authority over the state and public bodies.15 Read alongside cases like Gillan16 and
Austin,17 Arvind sees the House of  Lords in Bancoult (No 2) as being ‘disinclined to set
absolute boundaries on the power of  the executive, or to establish clear rules as to when
executive action will require specific parliamentary authorization’.18 Arvind does
acknowledge that there are recent cases, like HM Treasury v Ahmed,19 where the UK’s apex
court has placed limits upon executive action,20 but considers that the overall narrative
permits ‘islands of  principled rules . . . . [to] survive in a sea of  pragmatic standards’.21
Such accounts locate Bancoult within modern public law concerns. Whilst these insights
are undoubtedly important, we consider that the Chagos litigation must be understood in
the context of  broader jurisprudence on the management of  the empire. The expulsion of
the Chagos islanders following the establishment of  the BIOT as a defence colony does not
of  itself, we should note from the outset, differentiate the UK from the contemporary
practices of  other major colonial powers.22 Despite their developed conceptions of
freedom and justice, a succession of  Western legal orders became despotic when exported
through waves of  imperial expansion between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.23
Many small island colonies were treated as having particular defence significance in the
aftermath of  the Second World War, including the nuclear weapon testing by the USA at
Bikini Atoll and by France at Moruroa Atoll. The former instance involved expulsions of
the population of  affected islands which were broadly comparable to the UK’s treatment of
the Chagossians.24
Using the British Empire as a foil we explain how colonial projects came to be justified
and maintained through the self-same legal orders employed in the colonising states. We
reassess the Chagos litigation in light of  the mass of  new documentation released to the
National Archives in 2012. These documents tell the story of  the Chagos Islands from the
viewpoint of  the islands’ administrators, as distinct from the previously published Whitehall
records. As such, these records allow us to re-examine both the strategic significance of  the
islands that underpins the 50-year partnership between the UK and the USA and the
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13 Ibid 717.
14 T T Arvind, ‘“Though it Shocks One Very Much”: Formalism and Pragmatism in the Zong and Bancoult’
(2012) 32 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 113, 146.
15 Arvind notes that Lord Hoffmann identified this trend in recent judgments in his extra-judicial writings;
L Hoffmann, ‘The COMBAR Lecture 2001: Separation of  Powers’ (2002) Judicial Review 137, 137. 
16 R (Gillan) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] UKHL 12; (2006) 2 AC 307. 
17 Austin v Commissioner of  Police for the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5; (2009) 1 AC 564.
18 Arvind (n 14) 145. 
19 HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2; (2010) 2 AC 534.
20 Arvind (n 14) 145–6. 
21 Ibid 146, citing R Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Harvard University Press 2003) 61–71.
22 For instance, Belgian colonialism in the Congo (via Joseph Conrad) led to Francis Ford Coppola’s musings on
American Imperialism in his 1979 film, Apocalypse Now. See J Conrad, Heart of  Darkness and Other Stories
(Wordsworth Classics 1995). Likewise, German colonialism, and colonial oppression, in south-west Africa has
been recently documented by scholars. See G Krüger, ‘Coming to Terms with the Past’ (2005) 37 GHI Bulletin
45 and C Erichsen and D Olusoga, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of
Nazism (Faber & Faber 2011).
23 P Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of  Modern Law (Routledge 1992) 107.
24 See J Niedenthal, For the Good of  Mankind: A History of  the People of  Bikini and their Islands (2nd edn Bravo 2013).
approach to the common good in an imperial context which animated UK policy towards
the Chagos Islands and the Chagossians.25 We show that the imperial common good is
riven by competing theoretical justifications for empire: one, based in liberal imperialism,
emphasises the civilising nature of  empire and focuses on the good governance of  colonies;
the other, based in a utilitarian imperialism, instead focuses on how to best appropriate
colonial possessions for the benefit of  the imperial power. In this context it is hardly
surprising that ‘confusion about the relationship between imperial and local good (and
imperial and colonial law) continues to pervade judicial and scholarly discussion’.26 At every
turn, the Chagossians’ efforts to protect their interests by judicial review have confronted
the UK government with this imperial legacy and the competing justifications for that
legacy. This legacy cannot ultimately be wished away, and it showcases the continued
significance of  empire within public law and even under the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR).27
The uK–usA partnership and the BIoT’s creation 
The ambition amongst many of  the ‘empire builders’ who brought the British Empire
towards the zenith of  its power had been to ‘unite the settler colonies into an integrated and
enduring global polity’.28 Half  a century after Queen Victoria’s death, however, burgeoning
independence movements, the financial burdens of  two world wars and international
pressure for decolonisation had stifled such ambitions. But even as decolonisation gathered
pace in the 1950s, a Cold-War vision of  imperial retrenchment held sway over UK
policymakers. As Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in
1959, ‘we only need our Gibraltars’.29 In other words, expensive commitments over whole
swathes of  territory which could not be maintained could be substituted for control of
strategic outposts; unsinkable aircraft carriers enabling the UK to continue to project power
in regions far removed from its shores. At this juncture in the Cold War control of
strategically important islands came to be regarded as more important than direct control
of  extensive colonial possessions. This was because their value for global power projection
was not offset by the need to manage extensive hinterlands or the self-determination
demands of  sizeable populations.
Even as this policy was being articulated, however, it was already becoming beyond the
UK’s means. The UK’s pretensions of  ‘great power’ status had been hobbled by the Suez
Crisis, which highlighted its inability to act on the global stage without the sanction of  the
USA. The USA, by contrast, enjoyed both the capacity to militarise islands ‘east of  Suez’
and, in the Cold-War context, was increasingly eager to dominate the Indian Ocean ‘by
controlling every available piece of  territory, or at least by denying their use to the Soviet
Union and China’.30 The USA and UK began the coordinated evaluation of  the UK’s island
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25 Legal action over colonial-era atrocities in Kenya brought to light a store of  archival material on colonies,
including the BIOT, which had not been released to the UK National Archives (UKNA); see Mutua v Foreign
and Commonwealth Office [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB), [48]–[54]. In May 2011 the Foreign Secretary informed
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26 R Ekins, ‘Constitutional Principle in the Laws of  the Commonwealth’ in J Keown and R P George (eds),
Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of  John Finnis (OUP 2013) 396, 404.
27 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222 (1953).
28 D Bell, ‘From Ancient to Modern in Victorian Imperial Thought’ (2006) 49 Historical Journal 735, 738.
29 A Horne, Macmillan, 1957–1986 (Macmillan 1989) vol II, 691.
30 D Vine, Island of  Shame: The Secret History of  the US Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton University Press
2009) 60.
colonies for potential sites for a strategic hub in the Indian Ocean. Amongst these sites were
the Chagos islands, hitherto administered from Mauritius. Located in the centre of  the
Indian Ocean the Chagos archipelago provided a potential staging post for operations in
Africa, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and Australasia. Diego Garcia, the largest
of  the Chagos islands, was central to the UK–USA bilateral agreement concluded in 1966.31
This agreement provided that the UK would procure the land and the USA would finance,
construct and operate the planned defence facilities. The UK’s outlay was compensated by
a secret $14m mark-down on the Polaris missile technology shared by the USA, which
enabled the UK to maintain its nuclear deterrent.32 The official line was that the USA had
made no direct payments to the UK but had ‘shared certain costs in setting up BIOT’.33
The stakes were raised by the Soviet Union’s gradual build-up of  assets in the Indian Ocean
from March 1968, including its placing of  mooring buoys for a cluster of  auxiliary ships –
a ‘floating base’ – in international waters near the Chagos archipelago.34
Before ground could be broken on the new base, however, the UK would have to
navigate a series of  late-colonial problems (in the midst of  the reorganisations which would
see the Colonial Office rebranded as the Commonwealth Office in 1966 and merged with
the Foreign Office by 1968). The first of  these problems was how to repackage the UK’s
Indian Ocean colonies in the face of  the rapid movement of  Mauritius and the Seychelles
towards independence. Colonies had previously been carved up or parcelled off  on the
basis of  imperial interests, with scant regard for the affected populace.35 When
parliamentary questions were asked about whether the Heligoland population had
consented to the island’s transfer to Germany as part of  a colony-swap deal in the 1890s,
the Leader of  the House of  Commons responded with equanimity that the government did
not believe that the islanders would be ‘dissatisfied with the change’.36 Just as the opposition
charged that Heligoland and its population were being treated as ‘mere objects of  barter’,37
the formation of  the BIOT was regarded as one element of  an ‘inter-state’ arrangement
with the prospective leaders of  the soon-to-be independent colonies. In November 1965
the most promising sites were severed from their parent colonies, the Seychelles and
Mauritius, to form the BIOT.38 In return the Seychelles gained a new civil airport, which
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31 Exchange of  Notes between the Government of  the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of  the United States of  America Concerning the Availability for Defense Purposes of
the British Indian Ocean Territory (30 December 1966) Cmnd 3231; 603 UNTS 273.
32 See UKNA, FCO 141/1428, A B Urwick (FCO) to J C Moberley (UK Embassy, Washington DC) (24 June
1970). 
33 UKNA, FCO 141/1411, M Stewart (UK Foreign Secretary) to B Greatbach (Governor of  the Seychelles and
BIOT Commissioner) (1 December 1969). Even the opaque claim that the USA ‘made some adjustments in
other fields which are more favourable to UK than would otherwise have been the case’ was deemed to touch
too closely upon the Polaris arrangement; UKNA, FCO 141/1411, M Stewart (UK Foreign Secretary) to
B Greatbach (Governor of  the Seychelles and BIOT Commissioner) (26 November 1969).
34 See V B Bandjunis, Diego Garcia: Creation of  the Indian Ocean Base (iUniverse 2001) 97.
35 See S Allen, The Chagos Islands and International Law (Hart 2014) 120.
36 W H Smith, HC Deb 19 June 1890, vol 345, col 1369.
37 F Channing, HC Deb 28 July 1890, vol 347, col 1079.
38 BIOT Order SI 1965/1920, passed under the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895, s 1(1). See S A De Smith,
‘Mauritius: Constitutionalism in a Plural Society’ (1968) 31 Modern Law Review 601, 609.
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would open in 1972, to further its ambitions as a holiday destination.39 Mauritius received
direct payment of  £3m in February 1966.40
International opinion presented more of  a problem. Earlier efforts to repackage
colonies had not faced the attention of  the UN. The dismemberment of  these Indian
Ocean colonies to permit the creation of  ‘foreign bases’ had attracted considerable criticism
at the UN from its earliest phases,41 including a UN General Assembly Resolution asserting
that, prior to granting Mauritius independence, the UK should ‘take no action which would
. . . violate its territorial integrity’.42 Diego Garcia’s part in the scheme was presented as
hosting an ‘austere communications facility’ in order to deflect criticisms that the Indian
Ocean was being militarised.43
Acquiring copra plantations in the Chagos archipelago proved to be the least
complicated element of  the plan to implement. Almost all of  the land was owned by the
Chagos Agalega Company. Its plantations were secured by the UK government in a single
transaction under the authority of  the BIOT Order in Council44 and leased back to the
former owners whilst preparations for establishing defence facilities continued.45 The USA,
however, had been chastened by previous agreements with the UK over military bases. In
1940, the USA had exchanged 50 obsolete destroyers for a slew of  bases in the Atlantic and
Caribbean, in what had at the time seemed like a favourable deal. Less than a decade later,
however, almost all of  these facilities were gone. As they gained their independence
‘countries like Trinidad and Tobago evicted the United States from bases in their
territories’.46 The US government was determined not to repeat this experience and made
the 1966 Agreement conditional upon the requirement that the entire colony be free of
population.47 Excluding the population would serve the threefold purposes of  ensuring
base security, preventing oversight of  the BIOT by the UN Committee on Decolonisation
and negating the possibility that an independence movement would once again cost the
USA its investment.48
UK officials were initially confident of  their ability to fulfil this aspect of  the
agreement. Much of  the population was assessed to be made up of  migrant Mauritian and
Seychellois copra plantation workers, who could be returned to their home islands once
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39 Many UK officials believed that the £5.5m Seychelles airport was a white elephant, with one declaring that no
‘blue-haired American widow’ would regard the Seychelles as an attractive holiday destination. UKNA, FCO
141/1424, Sir Arthur Galsworthy Memorandum (26 October 1967) para 2.
40 As confirmation that they had struck a hard bargain, the UK government could point to the walkout of  Parti
Mauricien ministers from the Mauritius self-government over the inadequacy of  this compensation. See
De Smith (n 38) 609.
41 Ibid 611.
42 GA Res 2066 (XX Session) (16 December 1965) (89 votes to 0 (18 abstentions)). See also, for UK notes on
later resolutions condemning dismemberment and militarisation, UKNA, FCO 141/1428, B L Barder (UK
Mission to the UN), ‘Committee of  24: Mauritius, Seychelles, St Helena’ (8 August 1967).
43 For early discussion of  the base in these terms, see UKNA, CO 1036/1343, Colonial Secretary (Anthony
Greenwood) to Governors of  Mauritius and the Seychelles (19 July 1965) para 10. For its part, the US military
needed to play a long game, securing congressional approval and then steadily expanding commitments. See
Vine (n 30) 96–8, 120–2.
44 BIOT Order 1965 SI 1965/1920, s 3.
45 See UKNA, FCO 141/1458, Seychelles Supreme Court Registry, ‘Distribution of  Sale Price of  the Chagos
Archipelago’ (6 May 1967).
46 Vine (n 30) 59.
47 See UKNA, FCO 141/1416, FCO Pacific & Indian Ocean Department, ‘BIOT Working Paper 1: General
Background’ (March 1969) para 8.
48 Vine (n 30) 78–9.
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the plantations were closed. Amongst these workers, however, lived the islands’
permanent residents, the Chagossians.49 Known to colonial administrators as the Ilois,
some of  these islanders could ‘trace their roots on the islands back for two centuries’.50
The Chagossians’ numbers could well be downplayed, but acknowledging their very
existence triggered the long-standing principle that, in administering any part of  the
British Empire, ‘a colonial government cannot in any ordinary cases direct transportation
. . . [to] a particular place outside their jurisdiction’.51 The Colonial Office’s institutional
memory, however, provided precedents, as recent as 1945, for circumventing this
principle in the context of  island populations.52 Such exclusions had not drawn
international attention53 and officials initially maintained that ‘if  it becomes necessary to
transfer the whole population there will be no problem’.54 London assured the Seychelles
administration that ‘only Diego Garcia is likely to be taken over at once for defence
purposes’ and that this meant that the outer islands (especially Peros Banhos) could
absorb the displaced population.55 The blithe assertion of  one senior Foreign Office
official that ‘[u]nfortunately along with the Birds go some few Tarzans or Men Fridays
whose origins are obscure, and who are being hopefully wished on to Mauritius etc’,56 to
this day casts the department ‘in a light which does it no credit’.57
The world of  the mid-1960s, however, was far removed from the confusion of  the
immediate post-war period. The UN Charter began to generate considerable official
concern. The distinct nature of  the Chagos community, separated from Mauritius by 800
miles of  ocean, brought into play the ‘sacred trust’ Article 73 of  the Charter imposed on
colonial authorities regarding the treatment of  indigenous non-self-governing peoples. With
the islands already on the UN’s radar, the concern grew within the now-reorganised Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that the expulsion of  the Chagossians ‘may well attract
considerable attention’.58 Officials prevaricated, hoping that base security was the US
government’s main concern and that the Americans ‘will not raise any objection to the
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49 Population returns for the islands show considerable fluctuation in population between 800 and 1100 in the
1960s, in line not only with the hiring of  a migrant element within the plantation workforce, but also with the
movement of  many Chagossians to Mauritius and the Seychelles to visit family or access services (especially
medical services unavailable on the islands). See UKNA, FCO 141/1416, FCO Pacific & Indian Ocean
Department, ‘BIOT Working Paper 3: The Problem of  the People Living in the Chagos Archipelago’ (April
1969) paras 10 and  13.
50 G Robertson, ‘Who Owns Diego Garcia? Decolonisation and Indigenous Rights in the Indian Ocean’ (2012)
36 University of  Western Australia Law Review 1, 3.
51 W Craies, ‘Compulsion of  Subjects to Leave the Realm’ [1890] 6 Law Quarterly Review 388, 407.
52 The Banabans, for example, were not permitted to return to their phosphate-rich island home following their
brutal relocation at the hands of  Japanese forces during the Second World War. The island was subsequently
mined out. See Tito v Waddell [1977] Ch 106 and J McAdam, ‘Historical Cross-Border Relocations in the
Pacific: Lessons for Planned Relocations in the Context of  Climate Change’ (2014) 49 Journal of  Pacific
History 301.
53 See K Roberts-Wray, ‘Human Rights in the Commonwealth’ [1968] International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 908, 913–14.
54 UKNA, FCO 141/1422, R Newton, ‘Survey Report’ (23 September 1964) para 26.
55 UKNA, FCO 141/1406, Colonial Office to G P Lloyd (Colonial Secretary, Seychelles) (18 May 1965) para 4.
56 UKNA, FO 371/190790, D A Greenhill (Foreign Office Deputy Under-Secretary) to P Gore-Booth (Foreign
Office Permanent Under-Secretary) (24 August 1966).
57 Chagos Islanders v Attorney General [2003] EWHC 2222 (QB) [A74] (Ouseley J).
58 UKNA, FCO 141/1428, A S Papadopoulos (FCO), ‘Briefing Note: BIOT and the Committee of  24’
(28 August 1970) para 2.
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relocation of  people from Diego Garcia in Peros Banhos’.59 With delays in congressional
approval for base funding and a temporary waning in the US interest in Diego Garcia at the
height of  the Vietnam War, the islands remained populated long after the creation of  the
BIOT in 1965 and for more than five years after Mauritian independence in March 1968,
ultimately enabling the islanders to claim UK citizenship through the BIOT.60 In this period
the US government raised ‘no objection’ to continued settlement in the outer islands.61 At
this crucial juncture the archival record becomes somewhat muddled. The generally
accepted account is that the Nixon administration, on the basis of  Article 73 concerns,
reasserted the demand that the entire archipelago be cleared before work on the base would
commence.62 Seemingly faced with the risk of  the scheme collapsing, the colonial
authorities implemented a depopulation plan on the basis that all remaining islanders were
migrant labourers and that the Chagossians, even if  islanders for many generations, were
‘mostly Mauritian in origin’.63
But perhaps this account does the UK too much credit. After all, Whitehall officials had
advised from the outset that the Chagossians’ very existence as a distinct people would have
‘to be ducked if  possible’.64 Moreover, the Diego Garcia Agreement itself  speaks only of
restricting access of  non-military personnel to Diego Garcia and its lagoon,65 and not the
remaining islands, something which accords with the large number of  yachts which moor
annually at the outer islands.66 In August 1977 UK government legal advisers noted that the
reasons behind the 1969 decision to clear the islands ‘were financial and administrative
although potentially Anglo-US defence needs underlay them’.67 US ‘demands’ might well
have been a useful canard, enabling the UK government to explain the expulsions to its own
reluctant colonial administrators and subsequently to the courts. 
The isolation of  the islands aided the authorities in the expulsions. After slavery was
abolished throughout the colony of  Mauritius in 1835, the Chagossians became and
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59 UKNA, FCO 141/1416, FCO Pacific & Indian Ocean Department, ‘BIOT Working Paper 1: General
Background’ (March 1969) para 12. Officials on the ground continued to labour under this misapprehension
as late as 1971; see UKNA, FCO 141/1355, B Greatbach (Governor of  the Seychelles and BIOT
Commissioner), Hand-written Note (29 January 1971).
60 See R Gifford, ‘The Chagos Islands: The Land where Human Rights Hardly Happen’ [2004] Law, Social
Justice and Global Development Journal 1, 7. UK officials acknowledged that the Chagossians had citizenship
of  the UK and colonies during the evictions; UKNA, FCO 141/1355, P Carter (UK High Commissioner in
Mauritius) to E J Emory (FCO) (13 January 1971) para 2.
61 UKNA, FCO 141/1416, G Oplinger (US Embassy, London) to R Johnstone (FCO Defence (Policy)
Department) (22 November 1968) para 1.
62 See UKNA, FCO 141/1355, P A Carter (UK High Commissioner, Mauritius) to A B Urwick (Defence
Department, FCO) (2 November 1970) para 6. 
63 UKNA, FCO 141/1421, R C Arnold (Acting BIOT Administrator) to B Greatbach (Governor of  the
Seychelles and BIOT Commissioner) (2 April 1969) para 2.
64 Chagos Islanders v Attorney General (n 57) [A44] (Ouseley J). See UKNA, FCO 141/1415, Lord Longford
(Colonial Secretary) to H Norman-Walker (Governor of  the Seychelles and BIOT Commissioner)
(25 February 1966) para 3.
65 Exchange of  Notes Constituting an Agreement Supplementing the Above-Mentioned Agreement,
Concerning a United States Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory and
Replacing the Supplementary Agreement of  24 October 1972 (with annexed plan) (25 February 1976) 1018
UNTS 372, para 4.
66 Vine (n 30) 15.
67 UKNA, FCO 31/2193, J D P Bickford (FCO Legal Adviser) to G E Gammie (Treasury Solicitors’
Department) (4 August 1977) para 6.
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remained serfs.68 When the UK government purchased the copra plantations in 1967 the
islanders remained contract labourers with no property interests beyond mere licences.
Treating the expulsion of  the entire population as an up-scaled property issue, the islanders’
lack of  formal land holdings allowed the UK government to assert that ‘no-one has any
right to reside permanently on the islands’.69 Responding to questions about the islands’
population with the assertion that every person on the islands was a contract labourer was,
as FCO officials recognised at the time, a textbook exercise in legalism; ‘it does not give
away the existence of  the Ilois but is at the same time strictly factual’.70 A twentieth-century
audience, alien to the near-feudal arrangement of  the Chagos copra plantations, simply
accepted that some contract labourers could be not separated out from the migrant labour
employed on the plantations as ‘belongers’ on the islands. 
Under the cover of  this semantic umbrella, from the late 1960s administrators had
attempted to gradually reduce the islands’ population by preventing individuals and families
who left the islands for Mauritius or the Seychelles from returning, rather than enforcing
evictions. Many families and individuals were separated or stranded during this protracted
running down of  the islands, with Olivier Bancoult and his family being amongst those
prevented from returning after they travelled to Mauritius because of  a medical
emergency.71 The last of  the Chagossians were not expelled from Diego Garcia until
October 1971, months after construction teams from the US military had started work on
the island. Several hundred inhabitants would remain on the outer Chagos islands until May
1973.72 Some islanders were transferred to the copra plantations on Agalega. The majority
were deposited on Mauritius at the end of  a six-day voyage, the ultimate logic of  the fiction
that they were, after all, Mauritian citizens. At the time, however, even liberal UK
newspapers did little to dispute these arrangements, with The Observer merely expressing the
hope that ‘some money will be devoted to resettling the thousand or so inhabitants’.73 
Meanwhile, on Diego Garcia, by the spring of  1973 barracks and a 2500m runway had
been completed, to be followed a year later by a pool hall and bowling alley as facilities
rapidly expanded.74 The USA, with its 50-year renewable agreement secured, quickly
abandoned the pretence that Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia would be a ‘modest’
outpost which ‘will in no way constitute a base’.75 The island became ‘a naval
“prepositioning” port and “bomber forward operating location” subsequently used for all
US missions against Iraq and Afghanistan’,76 cementing the USA’s strategic position in the
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Indian Ocean. In the aftermath of  the 9/11 attacks, it would be used as a hub for
extraordinary rendition flights.77 The UK’s sovereignty over the BIOT accorded it few
privileges on Diego Garcia,78 but successive governments would continue to manage the
fall-out amongst its imperial subjects. Following the end of  the relocations, the Chagossians
undertook a decade-long struggle to get access to meaningful compensation.79 The Crown
paid out £4m in compensation on the basis that the recipients renounced all claims for
return to the Chagos Islands.80 Moreover, despite officials recognising that the Chagossians
were entitled to UK citizenship at the time of  the expulsions,81 the islanders were not
informed of  their ability to apply for passports and general citizenship claims were not
recognised until 2002.82
The management of colonies for the imperial good
Colonialism involves an assertion of  dominance, both of  the metropolis over the colony
and the settler over the native. This much was evident to Cicero when he considered
republican Rome’s control over Marseilles: ‘[e]ven though our clients the people of
Marseilles are ruled with the greatest justice by chosen leading citizens, that condition of  the
people still involves a form of  slavery’.83 The effect of  this power imbalance,
simultaneously underpinning and undermining imperial relationships, is often magnified by
an empire’s need to accommodate budgetary and security concerns.84 These tensions are
prominent in the UK’s treatment of  the Chagossians. Before we examine the courtroom
battles over the Chagossians’ treatment, we must therefore account for the conflicting
narratives of  empire to which those cases would give expression. This conflict centres on a
liberal ideal of  good order and governance of  a colony, civilisation coming through the
application of  a higher (European) legal order, and a utilitarian principle of  governance that
ensured a colony’s resources could be exploited for the benefit of  the empire at large. The
irony remains that the Chagossians were expelled as part of  a wider policy driven by anti-
imperialism and cost-saving.85 Within five years of  the start of  construction at Diego
Garcia, UK bases in the Maldives, Singapore and Malaysia all closed.86 The Wilson and
Heath governments were all too aware that the USA was ultimately assuming the cost of
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maintaining the West’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and could therefore afford to
push its own ‘demands, desires and whims’ with regard to the islanders.87
The division between natural and political societies in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan88
looms large in justifications for the British Empire. Hobbes’s state of  nature is one in which
people are guided by their emotions, preventing effective government by normative
structures.89 Within the state of  nature conflict develops between individuals over scant
resources. Individuals are free to attack one another for their own safety or a sense of
glory,90 producing conditions of  perpetual war ‘of  every man, against every man’.91 The
state of  nature is not completely lawless. Natural laws enable individuals to ‘plant, sow, build
or possess a convenient seat’.92 But these natural laws do not provide for effective
covenanting, mutual restraint and personal protection.93 For Hobbes, the state of  nature is
something that needs to be overcome if  an orderly society is to be established. Inhabitants
of  the state of  nature can do so by covenanting amongst themselves to create a Leviathan.94
Hobbes’ Leviathan amounts to a supreme sovereign which has the power to declare war and
make peace as it sees fit and to respond to crises in any way it deems necessary. Public safety
must be achieved through promulgating laws and establishing institutions which exist for
the good of  the people.95 The salus populi, or security of  the general populous, is thus the
primary concern of  government in a political society.96
Leviathan established a bipolar opposition between two societal orders; the lower order
of  the state of  nature and the higher order of  political state.97 This divide metamorphosed
into a point of  division between the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ worlds which would sustain
imperial thought into the twentieth century.98 John Austin identified natural society in the
‘savage societies which subsist by hunting or fishing in the woods or on the coasts of  New
Holland’99 and in the peoples which ‘range in the forests or plains of  the North American
continent’.100 His contemporary Joseph Chitty endowed the Crown with the qualities and
duties of  the sovereign Leviathan; ‘The Queen has an interest in all her subjects, who rightly
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look to the Crown, today, to the rule of  law which is given in the Queen’s name, for the
security of  their homeland within the Queen’s dominions.’101 
Nineteenth-century liberal defences of  the British Empire’s ‘civilising mission’
developed from this dichotomy.102 Until the nineteenth century, liberal thought in the UK
was predominantly anti-imperialist. Adam Smith was of  the view that trade with a far-flung
empire meant higher profits for the few, whilst undermining the UK’s overall competitive
position in trade with other foreign countries.103 Both Jeremy Bentham and James Mill
regarded the UK’s colonies as a major cause of  wars with other European powers and a
political liability.104 John Stuart Mill, however, considered that maintaining an empire served
the UK’s economic and political interests.105 To soften the centrality of  trade and profit
motive to the British Empire he also recast the empire as a historically distinctive
development.
The younger Mill’s view of  the nineteenth-century British Empire was necessarily
nuanced. The empire was, after all, composed of  settler colonies and non-settler
dependencies across the Americas, Asia, Africa, Oceania and Europe. Different colonies
were governed under different models depending upon their perceived civilisation and the
governance arrangements which the imperial authorities had inherited.106 Mill favoured
home rule for colonies that had majority European populations, such as Canada, Australia
and New Zealand.107 For as long as the peoples of  Asia and Africa remained unable to
govern themselves, however, Mill considered that they would have to remain subject to the
benevolent despotism of  colonial administrators.108 The empire’s ‘civilising mission’ was to
govern ‘uncivilised’ peoples and bring improvement to their lives: 
It is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the universal, condition
of  the more backward populations, to be either held in direct subjugation by the
more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendancy; there are in
this age . . . few more important problems, than how to organise this rule, so as
to make it a good instead of  an evil to the subject people.109
Because they were steeped in the ethos of  an advanced political society, the colonial officials
dispatched from London to administer conquered or ceded colonies could therefore know
and represent the natives better than they could themselves.110 Their duty to forge
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civilisation and order out of  disorder required the importation of  the home political
society’s institutional infrastructure.111 Administrators confidently usurped existing legal
cultures with familiar rules and processes: ‘Our law is in fact the sum and substance of  what
we have to teach them. It is, so to speak, the gospel of  the English, and it is a compulsory
gospel which admits of  no dissent and no disobedience.’112 The New Zealand Constitution
Act 1852, for example, gave New Zealand’s legislature the power ‘to make Laws for the
Peace, Order, and good Government of  New Zealand, provided that no such Laws be
repugnant to the Laws of  England’.113 This formula embedded the ‘fundamental principles’
of  the UK’s ancient constitution in the governance arrangements of  self-governing
colonies,114 without the need for London’s approval for new colonial enactments.115
Leading liberal imperialists considered the terms of  the repugnancy clause to be
‘sacramental words’116 which tied the administration of  the whole empire to its underlying
‘civilising mission’. Self-governing colonial administrations, however, bridled that this ‘vague
doctrine’ was a recipe for judicial challenges to the validity of  their enactments.117 The
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 abandoned the traditional formula,118 declaring that for the
provisions of  colonial law to be void for repugnancy it would have to run contrary to an
imperial statute which extended to the colony.119 Orders in Council making law for a
territory would also have to conform to such overarching statutes.120
The London courts were often prepared to set aside even this truncated oversight
function in the interests of  imperial expediency, developing a broadly utilitarian
jurisprudence. In Nyali Ltd v Attorney General,121 for example, the London courts refused to
accept a challenge to an exemption for bridge tolls for military traffic in 1950s colonial
Kenya. Denning LJ insisted that ‘[o]nce jurisdiction is exercised by the Crown the courts
will not permit it to be challenged’.122 Despite the banal subject matter of  the case, the
dispute took place against the backdrop of  the Mau Mau rebellion. Without mentioning the
rising, the London courts were signalling their disinclination to entertain challenges to
abuses of  power by the authorities in Kenya.123 The London courts also developed firewalls
within imperial jurisprudence, such as the theory of  multiple Crowns, to restrict the ability
of  colonial subjects to challenge actions taken by colonial authorities as actions of  the UK
government. In rejecting a legal action against the UK government by the Banabans over
their relocation from Ocean Island in 1945,  Megarry V-C maintained that ‘the government
of  the United Kingdom was not the government of  the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
The Chagos Islands cases: the empire strikes back
111 See J Roach, ‘James Fitzjames Stephen (1829–94)’ (1956) 88(1–2) Journal of  the Royal Asiatic Society 1, 6. For
an explanation of  how the BIOT Courts Ordinance 1983 usurped forgoing private law arrangements on the
BIOT, see Bancoult (No 2) (HL) (n 11) [154] (Lord Mance).
112 J F Stephen, quoted in E Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (OUP 1959) 302. 
113 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict c 72), s 53. 
114 Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204, 209 (Lord Mansfield).
115 W Gladstone HC Deb 21 May 1852, vol 121, col 958.
116 J Morgan, ‘Legal and Political Unity of  the Empire’ [1914] 30 Law Quarterly Review 393, 397.
117 Liyanage v The Queen (1967) 1 AC 259 (PC), 284, quoting with approval K C Wheare, The Statute of  Westminster
and Dominion Status (4th edn OUP 1949) 75–7.
118 Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, s 3 (28 & 29 Vict c 63).
119 Ibid s 2. The ethos of  the reform is summed up in the words of  one colonial secretary; it was ‘more important
to a country to be self-governed than well-governed’; L Harcourt, HC Deb 12 February 1914, vol 58, col 370.
120 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2006] EWHC 1038 (Admin); [2006]
ACD 81 at [143] (Hooper LJ). See I Hendry and S Dickson, British Overseas Territories Law (Hart 2011) 69.
121 Nyali Ltd v Attorney General (1956) 1 QB 1 (CA) and [1957] AC 253 (HL).
122 Ibid (CA) 15.
123 For an alternate reading of  the decision, see R (Bancoult) v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(No 2) [2007] 3 WLR 768; [2007] EWCA Civ 498, [39] (Sedley LJ).
275
at any material time’.124 This approach to dividing the Crown would be further extended to
the legislation of  the Crown in Council in Quark Fishing.125
Liberal imperialism can therefore be seen vying with utilitarian conceptions of  efficient
colonial administration, and the demands of  colonial self-governance, to inform the
direction of  imperial governance. Many leading nineteenth-century liberal imperialists were
also avowedly utilitarian in their outlook, an inconsistency only revealed when these
doctrines came into conflict. Both approaches can be traced to Hobbes’ binary distinction
between natural and political societies. Utilitarianism’s prioritisation of  the common good
was enthusiastically incorporated into a model of  imperial administration whereby colonies
could justifiably be used to serve the ends of  the imperial whole (directed by the UK’s needs
as the ‘hub’ political society). Parliamentarians appreciated that defence powers to ‘raise
fleets and armies and build forts’ were exercised by the Crown ‘for the government of  the
British empire as one body’.126 Adam Smith maintained that colonies could justifiably be
required to contribute to imperial defence: ‘public debt has been contracted in the defence,
not of  Great Britain alone, but of  all the different provinces of  the empire’.127 Thus in the
early twentieth century the Earl of  Cromer defended the benefits which the UK derived
from its subject colonies: 
An Imperial Power naturally expects to derive some benefits for itself  from its
Imperialism. There can be no doubt as to the quarter to which the Romans
looked for their profit. They exacted heavy tributes from their dependencies . . .
England has regarded trade with India, and not tribute from India, as the
financial asset which counterbalances the burden of  governing the country.128
Despite these protestations of  the centrality of  trade to the British Empire, colonial
possessions were, and are still, prima facie expected to contribute to the imperial whole. The
UK government’s denial, in the early 1990s, that it had any ‘selfish strategic or economic
interest’ in Northern Ireland was significant precisely because it set this region apart from
this imperial norm.129 When the imperial order and security were at issue, Victorian
imperialists broadly accepted ‘that the empire could not everywhere and all the time be
governed by recourse only to civilian legal norms’.130 Amidst uprisings against imperial rule
in the latter half  of  the nineteenth century, liberal imperialism, for all of  its rhetorical force,
began to lose ground to the rival accounts of  empire, including the ‘scientific’ accounts of
racial superiority unleashed by social Darwinism.131
In summary, colonial administrators under London’s direction considered themselves
better placed than the Chagossians to administer the BIOT and maximise its benefit for the
‘undivided’132 imperium. The islanders’ expulsion could be justified so long as it was cloaked
in legal authority in a hat tip to liberal imperialism, as their contribution to the realisation of
imperial security. As Foucault recognised, the particular security pressures of  the twentieth
century reinforced broad conceptions of  the common good: ‘[w]ars are no longer waged in
the name of  a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf  of  the existence
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(3)
124 Tito v Waddell (n 52) 255. 
125 See Quark Fishing (n 4), [19] (Lord Bingham) and [64] (Lord Hoffmann).
126 W Molesworth, HC Deb 6 May 1850, vol 110, cols 1172 and 1176.
127 Smith (n 103) 483.
128 E Baring, Ancient and Modern Imperialism (Longmans 1910) 41.
129 See E Mallie and D McKittrick, Fight for Peace: Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process (William Heinemann 1996)
107.
130 R W Kostal, A Jurisprudence of  Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of  Law (OUP 2005) 486.
131 See Mantena (n 102) 37–55 and Bell (n 28) 756.
132 Ekins (n 26) 404.
276
of  all’.133 Under the Cold War’s impetus, the militarisation of  island colonies was pursued
on the basis not merely of  imperial good, but of  the wider interests of  the Western military
alliance. The particular harm suffered by the Chagossians in their expulsion from their
homeland was, in the view of  the Wilson and Heath governments, more than offset by the
wider benefits to imperial defence. As soon as this conclusion was reached, and the Crown’s
allotted compensation provided, the only avenue by which the islanders could challenge
these dispensations was in a plea to the ‘conscience’ of  the imperial order embodied by the
London courts. 
The Chagos Islands cases as imperial jurisprudence
In 2000 Oliver Bancoult, a native Chagossian and leader of  the Chagos Refugees Group,
brought a judicial review claim challenging the legality of  the Immigration Ordinance 1971,
issued under the authority of  the BIOT Order 1965, which prevented any return by the
Chagossians to their homeland.134 The Crown’s effort to claim that the Immigration
Ordinance was created by the government of  BIOT and therefore outside the jurisdiction
of  the courts of  England and Wales was decried by Laws LJ as ‘an abject surrender of
substance to form’.135 The Ordinance was issued at the direction of  the UK government
and as such the court had the ability to review its validity and the validity of  decisions made
subject to it.136 The islanders’ difficulty, however, remained that the BIOT had been created
under the royal prerogative and the impugned actions were exercises of  prerogative powers.
Any effort to review such decisions seemed to conflict with the general injunctions against
the courts’ reviewing exercises of  the prerogative in the spheres of  foreign policy and
national security.137
In the Divisional Court Bancoult’s legal team made explicit the claim that the exiling
of  the Chagossians was void under chapter 29 of  Magna Carta. Magna Carta, which
‘followed the flag’ to the BIOT,138 was the centrepiece of  the UK’s legal inheritance to
its colonies touted by liberal imperialists. As a statute of  the imperial Parliament, the
claimants argued that it could be relied upon as the basis of  a challenge to the validity of
a colonial law under the terms of  the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. Chapter 29 states
that no freeman shall be exiled except by the law of  the land and had long been
considered ‘fatal to any royal claim to expel obnoxious subjects from the realm without
trial and verdict’.139 Laws LJ considered that this argument, with its capacity to
circumvent restrictions on the review of  prerogative powers, possessed a ‘beguiling
simplicity’.140 Ultimately, however, he recognised that if  a lawmaker has the authority to
make a law removing the islanders, then actions pursuant to that law cannot be repugnant
for breaching the Magna Carta.141 This conclusion did not mean that he was immune to
the allure of  the Magna Carta argument. He instead heralded it as the jurisdiction’s first
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proclamation of  the rule of  law, requiring the authorities to establish that the expulsion
of  the Chagossians was ‘done according to law’.142
The BIOT Commissioner was appointed under the prerogative to govern the territory
severed from Mauritius, holding powers to make law for ‘peace, order and good
government’ on the islands.143 It was under these powers that the islanders had been
exiled and the military base built and it was the supposed extent of  these powers which
concerned the Divisional Court. Powers to be exercised for the ‘peace, order and good
government’ of  a colony have a long history and previous authority had strongly
indicated that the phrase was to be read generously.144 Parliament’s statutes provided the
only limitations historically recognised upon such powers. Laws LJ, however, ruled that
while the power to act for peace, order and good government ‘may be a very large
tapestry . . . every tapestry has a border’.145 Not even these broad powers were capable
of  conferring upon a BIOT Commissioner the powers to exclude the Chagossians from
their homeland. The Chagossians, he declared, ‘are to be governed: not removed’.146 In
ruling the islanders’ exclusion to be ultra vires he side-stepped the national security
argument in play, stating that the reasons of  military security said to underpin the
Commissioner’s policy were ‘good reasons certainly’, but that they were ‘not reasons
which may reasonably be said to touch the peace, order and good government of  BIOT
. . . whether the test is to be found in our domestic public law . . . or in a more, or less,
intrusive approach’.147 As such, the Divisional Court held that ‘peace, order and good
government’ was a formula grounded in the vision of  liberal imperialism which could not
be reconciled with the exclusion of  a people from their homeland for extraneous
purposes. 
Laws LJ’s judgment challenged and restricted the Crown’s prerogative power, evoking
the spirit of  the British Empire as an empire of  law in which decisions about colonies and
their populations must be made in accordance not simply of  bare legal authority, but with
extended principles of  legality. Adam Tomkins trumpeted the judgment as a ‘bold and
welcome’ example of  the courts of  England and Wales countering the scandals and
excesses of  empire in the time-honoured manner:
[A] case decided on what might be called traditional administrative, rather than
newer constitutional, grounds: a relatively straightforward case of  legality and
vires, rather than one of  rights and neo-constitutional review.148
Following the Divisional Court’s judgment in Bancoult (No 1), the Labour government gave
the Chagossians a theoretical right to return to the islands other than Diego Garcia. The
then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook accepted the ruling and issued the Immigration
Ordinance 2000 which repealed the 1971 ordinance in its entirety.149 Return, however,
depended upon a series of  feasibility studies concerning the resettlement of  the Chagos
Islands by the Chagossians. In 2002, after receiving the findings of  the first study, the
government announced that resettlement of  the outer islands was not feasible. In 2004 two
Orders in Council to this effect were issued under the royal prerogative on the basis that life
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there would be too precarious to be sustained and that a depopulated Diego Garcia
remained necessary for defence purposes.150 As a form of  primary legislation, at least for
the purposes of  the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), these Orders in Council could not be
overturned on human rights grounds.151 The Crown’s intention was to create a legal block,
so that the Divisional Court’s decision that the expulsions were invalid would not prevent
the Chagossians’ continued exclusion from the islands. 
Bancoult challenged the legality of  these new Orders in Council, claiming that only
Parliament could authorise the removal of  the Chagos Islanders from BIOT. Bancoult
(No 2)152 might have concerned the new arrangements instituted by the Crown in 2004,
but the islanders considered this a continuation of  the historic injustices they had
suffered. The Crown regrouped from its earlier setbacks, with Laws LJ being accused of
‘historical amnesia’ in his decision that the BIOT Commissioner’s powers were limited to
securing ‘peace, order and good government’ for the Chagossians; the UK’s Sovereign
Base Area in Cyprus indicated that other colonial possessions have been maintained for
the purpose of  supporting the UK’s defence interests.153 This assault on the Divisional
Court’s reasoning in Bancoult (No 1) exposed the divide between the liberal and utilitarian
rationales for empire. The liberal ideal of  maintaining good governance could not be
resolved with the utilitarian need to exploit a colony and its resources for the good of  the
empire. Nonetheless, both the Divisional Court and the Court of  Appeal accepted that
use of  the prerogative power of  colonial governance did not enjoy generic immunity
from judicial review.154 In a judgment that owed much to Laws LJ’s decision in Bancoult
(No 1), the Court of  Appeal accepted that there was nothing in the character of  the
Orders in Council which made them non-justiciable on the grounds that their subject
matter concerned national security: 
[W]hile a natural or man-made disaster could warrant the temporary, perhaps
even indefinite, removal of  a population for its own safety and so rank as an act
of  governance, the permanent exclusion of  an entire population from its
homeland for reasons unconnected with their collective wellbeing cannot have
that character and accordingly cannot be lawfully accomplished by use of  the
prerogative power of  governance.155
A measure enacted to protect the security demands of  the US military, for Sedley LJ,
therefore ‘lies beyond the[se] objects, whether expressed in terms of  peace, order and good
government or in terms of  the legitimate purposes of  colonial governance’.156
By contrast the House of  Lords dwelt at length on whether its jurisdiction was
effectively ousted by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. Ultimately, only three of  the five
judges considered that the Orders in Council could even be assessed on their own merits.
Lords Rodger and Carswell were of  the opinion that the courts had no power to inquire
into whether colonial exercises of  the prerogative were in fact for the peace, order and good
government of  the inhabitants of  the territory.157 The remaining judges were willing to
review exclusion under the prerogative, with Lord Hoffmann recognising that the firewalls
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around colonial administration which he had helped to extend in Quark Fishing158 were
misplaced.159 Having gone to such lengths to open up a space for judicial oversight,
however, he placed considerable emphasis upon the policy concerns at play. He noted that
it was ‘quite impossible to say’ that excluding the islanders from the BIOT was unreasonable
or an abuse of  power.160 This is because prerogative powers governing a colony can be used
in the interests of  the Queen’s undivided realm. He further rejected the proposition that, in
ruling a colony under the prerogative, the authorities had to have regard only, or even
predominantly, to its inhabitants’ interests:
Her Majesty in Council is . . . entitled to legislate for a colony in the interests of
the United Kingdom. No doubt she is also required to take into account the
interests of  the colony (in the absence of  any previous case of  judicial review of
prerogative colonial legislation, there is of  course no authority on the point) but
there seems to me no doubt that in the event of  a conflict of  interest, she is
entitled . . . to prefer the interests of  the United Kingdom. I would therefore
entirely reject the reasoning of  the Divisional Court which held the Constitution
Order invalid because it was not in the interests of  the Chagossians.161
Analysed from a familiar public law perspective, the majority’s characterisation of  ‘the
colonial governance power as a plenary one’ may well seem ‘perplexing’ in the leeway it
gives to the executive.162 The majority did not carefully disaggregate the separate issue of
the power to exile of  a people, unlike the dissents and their ‘meticulous examination of  the
legal principles which justify the grant by the common law to one of  power over
another’.163
The majority judgments are not, however, an aberration. They might well be pragmatic
in their effect164 and parts may be under-reasoned,165 but they remain modern
manifestations of  imperial jurisprudence. The Crown considered the establishment of  a
base on Diego Garcia necessary for imperial defence. The ongoing exclusion of  the
islanders amounted to their contribution to the imperial good. Lord Hoffmann openly
acknowledged that the security uncertainties of  the Cold War and its aftermath require a
collective approach to defence which must be maintained even if  it causes specific
hardship.166 In a conflict of  interest between the imperial whole and individual colonies, he
considered that the government is entitled to ‘prefer the interests of  the United
Kingdom’.167 The House of  Lords decision in Bancoult (No 2) cannot therefore be
castigated for neglecting legal principle and developing the law in a manner which went
‘against the express words of  the very authorities they cited in support of  their decision’.168
The utilitarian strands of  the imperial legal framework are more than capable of  sustaining
the majority’s position. As Denning LJ declared in Nyali, it was impossible to transplant the
common law to the colonial context and ‘expect it to retain the tough character which it has
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in England’.169 Despite this ‘triumph’ of  utilitarian imperialism, the tension between the
rationale behind empire continued. Judicial review principles might be traduced in the
colonial context but the liberal justification of  empire remained, in its most bare form, in
place. The exclusion of  the Chagossians from their territory was sanctioned in law. In return
for their homeland they received the majesty of  due legal process.
The Chagossians’ legal battle continues 
Elliott and Perreau-Saussine called Bancoult (No 2) ‘pyrrhic public law’,170 for the majority’s
willingness to circumvent the ouster clause contained in the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865
and review the continued exclusion of  the Chagossians, but not to ultimately uphold their
claims and strike down the Orders in Council. The positive effect for public law of  the
court’s recognition of  its ‘jurisdiction to review the limits of  the prerogative of  colonial
governance’ is all but undone by the majority’s failure to constrain prerogative lawmaking
on the basis of  ‘a fundamental right of  abode’.171 This leaves us to question, however,
whether the outcome for the Chagossians would really have been any better had the judicial
review succeeded. Even if  the courts had denied the lawfulness of  their exclusion as a
matter of  immigration law, Sedley LJ recognised that ‘the Crown has rights as landowner
which are capable, for the present, of  answering any attempt to resettle there’.172
Whilst a majority of  Law Lords recognised that the BIOT is covered by a governance
order informed by substantive principles, none of  the accounts presented an order
comparable to those of  the UK’s domestic jurisdictions. Whilst Lords Bingham and Mance
would have struck down the Orders in Council, neither considered that the ECHR extended
to the Chagos archipelago.173 As such, their judgments recognised ‘no legal obligation to
facilitate this entry or presence’.174 Without the full panoply of  internationally recognised
rights protections in play, the islanders ultimately enjoyed no legal avenue by which to assail
the Crown’s freehold, which Lord Mance recognised could, even had his judgment been in
the majority, ‘prevent any private initiative to settle’.175 Well might he assert that the
‘symbolism’ of  accepting the islanders’ claim would have remained important
notwithstanding this outcome,176 but the benefit might have been more for the court’s
conception of  its role than for the islanders. 
With the sympathy of  the Law Lords ringing in their ears, the islanders proceeded to
Strasbourg in what seemed like a final effort to unlock the human rights grounds which
could provide a substantive basis for challenging their exclusion. From the outset, the
omens were not good. The ECHR, drafted in the aftermath of  the Second World War and
ratified by the UK at a time when the British Empire was rapidly disintegrating, was
nonetheless crafted in such a way as to facilitate the management of  overseas empires by
the colonial powers of  Europe. Article 56 ECHR requires contracting states to explicitly
extend the ECHR’s protections to colonised territories, something which the UK did not
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do with regard to the BIOT.177 Similarly, when the UK ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)178 it ‘reserved the right not just to apply the
Convention separately to each of  the territories of  the UK and Colonies, but also to apply
such immigration legislation in each of  its territories as it thought fit’.179 The House of
Lords had previously ruled that the ECHR’s ambit was not extended simply because, in
reaching a decision with human rights consequences, ‘the contracting state government
attached weight primarily or solely to the interests of  the contracting state as distinct from
the interests of  its overseas territory’.180
From the 1970s onwards the UK government’s legal advisors were confident that the
administration of  the BIOT was insulated from an ECHR application.181 And so it was to
prove. For all that the European Court abhorred ‘the callous and shameful treatment’ of  the
Chagossians,182 it was forced to accept that the ECHR offered no refuge, as it was
‘incontrovertible that at no time was the right of  individual petition extended to BIOT’.183
Moreover, ‘[a]nachronistic as colonial remnants may be, the meaning of  Article 56 is plain
on its face and it cannot be ignored merely because of  a perceived need to right an
injustice’.184 The court consoled itself  with the conclusion that compensation claims over
expulsion had been ‘raised in the domestic courts and settled, definitively’ and that all
subsequent cases amounted to an effort by the islanders ‘to bring pressure to bear on
Government policy rather than disclosing any new situation giving rise to fresh claims under
the Convention’.185
Even under the ECHR, therefore, ‘the needs of  the inhabitants of  a colony are often
secondary to that of  the colonial power’.186 This observation is particularly pertinent when
considered in light of  the April 2010 decision by the UK government to establish a Marine
Protected Area (MPA) around the Chagos archipelago, ostensibly to protect the
environment and advance scientific research.187 In negotiations with the US government,
revealed during the 2010 WikiLeaks release of  US diplomatic cables, Colin Roberts (the
then BIOT Commissioner) talked up the ancillary security benefits of  establishing the MPA:
Roberts stated that . . . there would be ‘no human footprints’ or ‘Man Fridays’ on
the BIOT’s uninhabited islands. He asserted that establishing a marine park
would, in effect, put paid to resettlement claims of  the archipelago’s former
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residents . . . [because] the UK’s ‘environmental lobby is far more powerful than
the Chagossians’ advocates’.188
He added ‘“[w]e do not regret the removal of  the population” since removal was necessary
for the BIOT to fulfill [sic] its strategic purpose’.189 The analysis of  this proposal by US
Embassy officials suggested that the US government was increasingly concerned about the
possibility of  resettlement.190 The cable release was an unexpected boon for the
Chagossians’ legal strategy, allowing them to mount a fresh challenge to UK policy on the
basis that the MPA had been established on the basis of  an improper motive.191 The MPA’s
hasty unveiling, barely a month before a general election, accorded with US government
concerns that should the Conservatives take office they might ‘go soft’ on the
Chagossians.192 In the course of  the judicial review hearings, Roberts accepted that he had
advanced the MPA on the basis that ‘there should be no human footprint in the Chagos
Archipelago other than on Diego Garcia’ and that he had conveyed the UK government’s
support for an MPA on the basis that it ‘would create a serious obstacle to resettlement’.193
The Chagossians claimed that this leaked record revealed that an improper motive,
preventing them from ever resettling the islands, explained the foundation of  the MPA
rather than the environmental concerns which provided the public basis for its creation.
The crux of  such a challenge is that powers conferred for public purposes ‘can validly be
used only in the right and proper way’,194 with the difficulty where mixed motivations are
in play being for the courts to assess whether the valid purpose (here environmental
protection) is dominant.195
Neither the Divisional Court nor the Court of  Appeal196 would consider the substance
of  this claim in any depth, with both devoting the bulk of  their attention to whether the
leaked cables were even admissible as evidence. Under the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
the UK maintains that official correspondence of  diplomatic missions such as the US
Embassy are ‘inviolable’.197 The Divisional Court accepted that this provision prevented
the WikiLeaks cables from being admissible evidence and curtailed any cross-examination
of  FCO officials on the basis of  the cables.198 Even though the cables were in the public
domain, the government maintained that the courts should close their minds to them
entirely, as consideration ‘would be damaging to international relations and defence’.199 The
Court of  Appeal, concerned that this stance opened the courts to ridicule, recognised that
the cable should have been admitted:
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[T]he documents were sent from the US mission in London to Washington with
the consent of  the sending state and were communicated to the world by a third
party. Mr Bancoult was not implicated in the removal of  the documents from the
mission or their publication to the world.200
Despite this concession the court refused to accept that the Divisional Court’s stance had
impeded the presentation of  the Chagossians’ case. Nor did they move beyond a cursory
consideration of  their claim of  improper motive.201 The judges’ main concern seemed to
be to avoid dwelling, if  at all possible, on the content of  the cables. Rather than treating
them as affirming the utilitarian dominance of  the security rationale underpinning the
BIOT’s existence, and that environmental concerns provided a convenient ruse for
adding a further layer of  difficulty to the Chagossians’ return, the Divisional Court
described this account as being an ‘unconvincing plot for a novel’.202 Given all the history
of  official duplicity surrounding the BIOT, such assertions mark a singular failure of
judicial imagination. In any event, an improper motive on the part of  officials disclosed
by the cables could not, both courts found, be imputed to the Foreign Secretary who took
the ultimate decision to establish the MPA.203 The courts took David Milliband’s
acknowledgment that the MPA would be reconsidered if  the Chagossians’ application
succeeded before the European Court as important evidence of  his good faith.204 Given
the insurmountable procedural hurdles faced by this application, this supposed
concession should have been dismissed as mere window dressing. No judge attempted to
explain how the WikiLeaks cable (broadly accepted as accurate by Colin Roberts’
evidence, with the exception of  the ‘Man Friday’ comment) fits within this account. 
These two decisions are markedly different in tone from previous Bancoult judgments.
Both open with an identical formula; that this case ‘is a further chapter in the history of
litigation arising out of  the removal and subsequent exclusion of  the native population from
the Chagos Archipelago’.205 This formula at once fails to blame any party for the ‘removal
and subsequent exclusion’ and creates the impression that the islanders have overstayed
their welcome in the Royal Courts of  Justice. The islanders have gone from being claimants
entertained with sympathy to being viewed with suspicion as serial litigants.206 Both courts
studiously avoid expressing any sympathy towards the Chagossians, lest such statements be
employed outside the courtroom as part of  a strategy to embarrass the UK government
into concessions.207 Both courts even try to rewrite the history of  the dispute and litigation
in an effort to mitigate any embarrassment. A clear signal that the Divisional Court regarded
the Chagossians as having been over-indulged from the outset is the description of  the
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Bancoult (No 1) challenge as being ‘long out of  time’.208 If  only, the court seems to be
suggesting, time limits had been observed from the outset, then this whole train of  litigation
would never have been set in motion. Flying in the face of  the repeatedly traversed record
of  the expulsion, the Court of  Appeal’s factual history of  the dispute blandly asserts that
the Chagossians ‘left’ the islands by the end of  May 1973, as if  there was an element of
choice in the matter.209 Once the London courts consider imperial justice to have been
done, woe to the colonial litigant who dares to ask for more.
Conclusion: the phoenix and the ashes
Considered in isolation, the description of  the Chagossians as ‘Man Fridays’ at the time of
their expulsion and its association with the MPA’s creation fully 40 years later suggests that
the whole saga can be characterised by UK officialdom’s persistent callous indifference
towards the islanders. When the fresh archival materials are considered as a whole, however,
official accounts of  the Chagossians’ expulsion display widespread despondency and
uncertainty over BIOT policy. Many officials, reflecting liberal imperialist views, regretted
and even resented the manner in which the Chagossians were ‘chucked out of  UK
territory’.210 The repeated delays upon the expulsion policy, which was only executed some
four years after travel restrictions to the BIOT had been initiated, reflect the protracted
efforts by officials on the ground to circumvent demands that the entire archipelago be free
of  population. Even when Sir Bruce Greatbatch characterised the islanders as ‘untrainable’,
he did so with the aim of  slowing the expulsion process.211 If  the Man Fridays epithet
illustrates London officials’ attitudes of  imperial and even racial superiority over the
Chagossians, then this internal resistance nonetheless indicates the extent to which many
colonial administrators could not reconcile the expulsion policy with the concomitant
obligations they felt towards a colonised population. Monetary compensation would
ultimately be provided, even if  so belatedly as to suggest that it was intended more to
assuage the authorities’ concern for the precepts of  liberal imperialism than to provide
meaningful recompense. 
The consistent stonewalling of  the Chagossians’ claims, however, may point to a
conclusion that either the Crown considers its obligations fulfilled and/or that the belief  in
liberal imperialism, so pervasive amongst the last generation of  administrators of  the ‘old’
empire, no longer holds much sway over policymakers. Colonies and dependencies continue
to be viewed more as resources to be exploited for the good of  the undivided (and UK-
centred) realm over and above the needs of  their individuated populaces. Responsible
government, for Richard Ekins a theory ‘central to the imperial constitution’,212 becomes a
matter of  form rather than substance. And yet, despite the defeat of  successive waves of
the Chagossians’ litigation, these legal challenges were not without positive impact. The
discovery processes in these cases highlighted the injustices inherent in the BIOT’s
administration,213 leading the UK Coalition government to commission a 2014 study which
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accepted the feasibility of  resettlement centred upon Diego Garcia.214 With the 50-year
window for the renewal of  the base arrangements providing an opportunity for maintaining
pressure on the state parties, the Chagossians and the US military could well be persuaded
to share the territory (especially as Mauritius, if  it gained sovereignty over the archipelago,
would not oppose the maintenance of  the US base).215 Such a move would not change the
significance of  the BIOT for defence, but it would potentially bring its administration into
alignment with other colonies which continue to serve ‘military purposes’,216 including
Ascension Island, the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. 
If  the resettlement report holds out the potential for a phoenix, then what of  the ashes?
The litigation challenging the legality of  the expulsions cannot, in the final analysis, be reduced
to a clash between pragmatic formalism and the fundamental principles of  public law. Even
if  public law principles had ultimately carried the day for the Chagossians, as they had in the
Court of  Appeal (and may yet in the Supreme Court),217 the Crown could continue to
exercise its private law rights of  property ownership over the islands to exclude the islanders.
Nor do these decisions mark a clash between imperialism and anti-imperialism within the
highest courts of  England and Wales. No matter how favourably disposed individual judges
might have been towards the Chagossians, no judge was able to sunder the imperial
relationship underpinning this case. Even the European Court found its jurisdiction
circumscribed by the imperial context in which the ECHR was created. Instead, the choice in
these cases was between liberal imperialism and utilitarian conceptions of  the imperial
common good. The Chagossians expulsion from their homeland was driven by an imperial
account of  the common good which prioritised the interests of  the imperial whole over the
needs of  a particular group of  subjects; ‘[l]ooming over all considerations were the twin issues
of  prohibitive cost and the United Kingdom’s interests in co-operation with an important ally
in maintaining a secure defence installation’.218 This vision of  empire was contested, in the
course of  both official discussions and court cases, by liberal imperialism, with its emphasis
in the Chagossians’ context upon imperial stewardship over a precarious island community
which would face supposedly insurmountable difficulties in exercising self-governance.
For centuries the UK’s domestic courts acted as an important safety valve within the
empire, being seen as the last refuge for victims of  imperial injustices.219 In the Bancoult
litigation, however, the judges tasked with deciding upon this particular late-imperial
injustice were trapped in a double bind. Many of  them also found that the empire’s legal
architecture prevented them from addressing the islanders’ claims. Faced with this
realisation, judges like Lord Rodger and Lord Carswell sympathised with the ‘disgraceful’
treatment of  the islanders,220 even tacitly apologised for their judgments,221 but ultimately
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did not (or as they would have it, could not) accept the islanders’ claims. Alongside their
judgments, Lord Hoffmann acknowledged that a choice between the liberal and utilitarian
faces of  imperialism did rest with the court, and decisively affirmed the utilitarian
importance of  the imperial interests at stake in light of  ‘the brutal realities of  global
politics’.222 His distaste for the islanders’ litigation strategy,223 which he saw as trying to
force open a settled dispute, in which ‘the deed has been done, the wrong confessed,
compensation agreed and paid’, was scarcely concealed.224 At this uncomfortable end of
the legal process, the majority in the House of  Lords accepted that their decision reflected
the imperial commonweal. 
Rather than shedding the imperial jurisprudence of  old, even the judges who would
have found for the islanders, including Lord Bingham, Lord Mance, Laws LJ and Sedley LJ,
remained trapped within a liberal–imperialist approach towards the governance of  the
BIOT. Striking down the 2004 Orders in Council might well have embarrassed the UK
government, but it would not, as Lord Hoffmann pointed out, have obliged it to facilitate
the return of  the islanders,225 still less to govern the islands in accordance with human
rights norms. Such efforts to oblige the Crown to use its powers over the BIOT in
adherence to a bare conception of  ‘good governance’ do not deny the imperial domination
of  the islands. Moreover, jurisprudence in this vein comes with all of  the baggage of
asserting the UK’s superiority as a civilisation. Before the First World War, the Earl of
Cromer posited that the British Empire ‘must rest on one of  two bases – an extensive
military occupation or the principle of  nationality’, lamenting that the UK had been unable
to choose between these options.226 The alternative judicial path in the Chagos judicial
reviews would have aggrandised the courts and might even have given some solace to the
islanders (or for Lord Mance, would at least not ‘add insult to injury’),227 but imperial
governance in the archipelago would have continued on the model of  military occupation
to the exclusion of  the islanders. 
By the time of  the WikiLeaks case, this dilemma had either become so embarrassing, or
the characterisation of  the Chagossians as politically motivated litigants so pervasive, that
the Divisional Court and Court of  Appeal did all that they could to avoid ruling on the
content of  the cables. Even when judges have declared themselves unable to tackle the
underlying imperial injustice in the Chagos cases their value to imperial administration as a
nominal check on power has not diminished; ministers have consistently deflected awkward
parliamentary questions regarding the islands by asserting that ‘the UK courts have
considered the issues very carefully’.228 The approach of  the courts has therefore cloaked
UK policy in a protective veil of  legalism. Perhaps the ultimate lesson of  the Bancoult
litigation is that the UK must face up to an uncomfortable reality. In its relationship towards
the BIOT it is not a postcolonial state, but has remained a colonising power in the interests
of  retaining its capacity (even if  outsourced to the USA) for power projection across the
Indian Ocean. Official acts which would be considered illegal if  ever contemplated within
the UK remain, despite appeals to human rights, colour-blind justice, the rule of  law and
the undivided realm, legally defensible when applied within this colonial sphere.
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